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Abstract
The paper concerns the protection of the secrecy of ballots, so that the identity of the voters
cannot be matched with their vote. To achieve this we use an entangled quantum state to represent
the ballots. Each ballot includes the identity of the voter, explicitly marked on the ”envelope”
containing it. Measuring the content of the envelope yields a random number which reveals no
information about the vote. However, the outcome of the elections can be unambiguously decided
after adding the random numbers from all envelopes. We consider a few versions of the protocol
and their complexity of implementation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Assume n parties participate in a vote to decide between a few alternatives. Each par-
ticipant chooses his or her preference, designates it on the ballot, and puts in in the box.
There are various ways in which the secrecy of the vote can be compromised, and we shall be
particularly interested in the case of marked ballots. In this conspiracy the ballot is made to
include the voter’s identity, by secretly marking it prior to the vote or during it. To choose
a rather paranoid scenario: Big Brother finds traces of the voter’s DNA on the paper ballot.
Or, in the case of an electronic ballot, a string containing the voter’s identity, which has just
been varified prior to voting, is stored together with the vote.
In this paper we use entangled qbits to prevent such schemes. Each ballot may very well
include the identity of the voter, explicitly marked on the ”envelope” containing it. However,
this is inconsequential because reading the contents of the envelope rveals a random number,
and no information about the vote. On the other hand, the outcome of the elections can be
unambiguously decided after adding the random numbers from all envelopes.
A few quantum voting protocols have been proposed recently: Singh and Srikanth [1]
suggested to use a quantum version of sealed envelopes; any attempt to read their content
by unauthorised persons can be detected. Vaccaro et.al. [2] proposed a voting scheme in
which the number of votes is coded into the phases of an entangled state and reading the
result involves a complicated measurement. A protocol more similar to the present one has
been proposed by Hillery et.al. [3]. In their protocol the election result is also encoded into
the phases of a quantum state, and its reading involves a complicated measurement. Our
mechanism is different from [3] in various respects which will be noted below. In particular,
the voting result is coded and read directly from the computation basis states. The protocol
can be implemented as soon as the implementation of the discrete Fourier transform becomes
possible.
We begin with a protocol for a vote to decide between two alternatives. Although the
protocol is valid for any number of voters n ≥ 2, its implementation may be complicated
when thousands of citizens participate in the elections. To ammend this situation we also
propose an alternative version, whose complexity depends on the number of ballot boxes.
The security of the protocol remains intact provided this number is ≥ 2. Subsequently, the
scheme is generalized to include a choice between more than two alternatives. Finally, the
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complexity of implementation is calculated.
II. THE PROTOCOL
Let m be a natural number. Consider an m dimensional space with basis vectors:
|0〉 , |1〉 , ..., |m− 1〉. The m-th order discrete Fourier transform is defined to be
Fm |j〉 = 1√
m
m−1∑
l=0
exp(
2piijl
m
) |l〉 , j = 0, 1, ..., m− 1 (1)
Subsequently we shall suppress the subscript m, and denote the Fourier transform by F .
Let Π be the unitary operator which defines the following cyclic permutation on the basis
elements:
Π |0〉 = |1〉 , Π |1〉 = |2〉 , ... ,Π |m− 1〉 = |0〉 (2)
or, in short Π |j〉 = |j ⊕ 1〉 where ⊕ represents addition modm.
Suppose that we distribute among n voters the entangled state
|W 〉 = 1√
m
m−1∑
j=0
|j〉 |j〉 ... |j〉 (3)
where each |j〉 is an m-dimensional basis state, and each product in the sum (3) contains
n copies. The relation between n and m will be fixed later. Each voter has to vote either
NO, in which case he applies F to his bit; or YES, in which case she applies ΠF (that is, F
followed by Π)1. Suppose the votes were a1, a2, ..., an, with ak = 0 in case of a NO vote by
person k, and ak = 1 in case of a YES vote. Put Π
0 = I (identity) and Π1 = Π, then after
the vote the state is:
|V 〉 = (Πa1F)⊗ (Πa2F)⊗ ...⊗ (ΠanF) |W 〉 = (4)
=
1√
m
m−1∑
j=0
(Πa1F) |j〉 ⊗ (Πa2F) |j〉 ⊗ ...⊗ (ΠanF) |j〉 =
=
1√
m
m−1∑
j=0
(
Πa1
1√
m
m−1∑
l1=0
exp(
2piijl1
m
) |l1〉
)
⊗ ...⊗
(
Πan
1√
m
m−1∑
ln=0
exp(
2piijln
m
) |ln〉
)
1 Hillery et. al. [3] use the same initial state |W 〉, apply F for the YES vote and I (identity) in the NO
vote. The election outcome is then recorded in the phases of a complicated state.
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Performing the tensor product we get:
|V 〉 = 1√
m
m−1∑
j=0
1
m
n
2
∑
l1,...,ln
exp
(
2piij
m
(l1 + ... + ln)
)
|l1 ⊕ a1〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ln ⊕ an〉 (5)
exchanging the order of summation
|V 〉 = 1
m
n+1
2
∑
l1,...,ln
(
m−1∑
j=0
exp
(
2piij
m
(l1 + ... + ln)
))
|l1 ⊕ a1〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ln ⊕ an〉 (6)
Unless l1 + ...+ ln ≡ 0(modm) we have
∑m−1
j=0 exp
(
2piij
m
(l1 + ... + ln)
)
= 0. Hence the result
of the vote is
|V 〉 = 1
m
n−1
2
∑
l1+...+ln≡0(modm)
|l1 ⊕ a1〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ln ⊕ an〉 (7)
Now, we measure the basis vectors and add the results modm. Since l1+ ...+ ln ≡ 0(modm)
for every component in the superposition in Eq.(7), we are left with the outcome a1 +
...+ an(modm).
III. APPLICATIONS
1. In the simplest case we choose m > n, preferably we let m be the smallest power
of two greater than n, so we can use qbits. Then, after adding the measurement results
modm, we simply get a1 + ... + an, which is the number of YES votes. The secrecy of the
vote is maintained because every individual ”ballot” |lr ⊕ ar〉 contains the actual vote ar
added modm to a random number lr between 0 and m − 1. Note that the ballots are not
mixed, and it may be public knowledge that the ballot |lr ⊕ ar〉 comes from voter r (we
may even attach an extra probe carrying his or her name). However, this information is
inconsequential, it only reveals the fact that person r participated in the poll.
Actually, we do not have to know in advance how many people will vote, just choose n to
be sufficiently large. Since at the end of election day we know the exact number of people
who participated, we push the NO button as many times as required to reach n. After the
measurement we subtract the number of fictional votes and announce the election results.
There is a classical protocol which is similar to the quantum ballot, but is nevertheless less
secure: A sequence of n random numbers (l1, ..., ln) is generated and their sum y = l1+...+ln
stored. When citizen r is voting ar, the electronic voting machine stores only the number
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lr + ar. This way the privacy of the vote is protected. At the end of the day the stored
numbers are added, and then y subtracted. This protocol is secured only to the extent that
the values of the random numbers are protected. In the classical world there is always an
interval of time when the values of the lr’s themselves are present in the system. In the
quantum protocol, by contrast, the numbers lr are generated only upon measurement, and
are present only in the compounds lr ⊕ ar.
Note that an identical result obtains if we change the protocol slightly: Firstly, we dis-
tribute among the voters the state
|U〉 = (F ⊗ F ⊗ ...⊗F) |W 〉 = 1
m
n−1
2
∑
l1+...+ln≡0(modm)
|l1〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |ln〉 , (8)
and secondly, each voter applies Π for a YES vote, or I for NO. The choice between the two
versions will depend on the technical detail of implementation.
It goes without saying that even a quantum protocol cannot be secured against all possible
attacks by Big Brother, such as complete rewiring of the voting machine, or the installation
of video cameras in the voting booths.
2. The single element that makes the protocol difficult to execute is the number of voters
n. The difficulty is expressed in the structure of the initial state |W 〉 in Eq.(3), where each
component is a tensor product of n states. If we consider a vote of a small committee then
producing |W 〉 seems feasible; but what if millions of people vote? Luckily we can simplify
the protocol to include this case. To do this let N stand for the number of ballot boxes, and
assume that in the state |W 〉 each component has N copies, one for each box. However, we
keep m larger than the total number of voters n. Now, early in the morning on election day,
an official performs F once for each box, and this is the last time the Fourier transform is
applied to the box. Subsequently, any NO voter applies I (identity) to the part of the state
corresponding to his box, and any YES voter applies Π. By repeating the same calculation
we get the post election state
|V 〉 = 1
m
N−1
2
∑
l1+...+lN≡0(modm)
∣∣l1 + a′1 + ...+ a′k1(modm)〉⊗...⊗∣∣lN + a′′1 + ... + a′′kN (modm)〉
(9)
Where a′1, ..., a
′
k1
, are the votes cast in box 1, and so on, to a′′1, ..., a
′′
kN
, the votes in box N .
Again, since l1+ ...+ lN ≡ 0(modm), then measuring the basis states and adding the results
modm yields the sum of all YES votes from all boxes (recall that we kept m larger than n).
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So why not take N = 1, that is, only one box for all voters? In this case |W 〉 =
1√
m
∑m−1
j=0 |j〉, and F |W 〉 = |0〉, and thus |V 〉 = Πa1Πa2 ...Πan |0〉 = |a1 + ...+ an〉 is the sum
of all YES votes. In other words, using the protocol with a single ballot box brings us back
to a classical voting system represented by an unentangled quantum state. But already with
N = 2 there is a random element in the protocol, hiding the number of YES votes that each
box contributes.
3. Suppose that there are more than two alternatives, not just YES and NO, but three
candidates to choose from, call them I, II, and III. For n voters we choose m to be bigger
than 2n and use two copies of |W 〉, call them |W 〉1 and |W 〉2. Now, each voter applies the
following rule: For candidate I apply F to |W 〉1 and F to |W 〉2, For candidate II apply
ΠF |W 〉1 and ΠF |W 〉2, and for III apply Π2F |W 〉1 and ΠF |W 〉2. Let nI , nII and nIII
be the numbers of votes cast for the respective candidates. Applying a measurement to
|V 〉1, the post elections state of |W 〉1, we obtain the outcome nII + 2nIII . Measuring |V 〉2
yields nII + nIII . Since we know n = nI + nII + nIII , we can infer the election results.
Generalizations to a larger number of alternatives is straightforward.
IV. COMPLEXITY OF IMPLEMENTATION.
The implementation of the protocol requires three steps:
1. The creation of the state |W 〉. Consider first the basis states copier defined on
C
m ⊗ ...⊗ Cm (n copies) and whose effect is, in particular
|j〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |0〉 → |j〉 ⊗ |j〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |j〉 0 ≤ j ≤ m (10)
To implement this suppose m = 2k, then the operation |j〉⊗ |0〉 → |j〉⊗ |j〉 can be achieved
using bit by bit copying, each bit by the implementation of two CNOT gates [4], altogether
2k gates. Generalizing to n copies we need O(kn) gates, k = log2m. To create |W 〉,
therefore, we apply this copying mechanism to (m−
1
2
∑m−1
j=0 |j〉) ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ ... ⊗ |0〉, where the
state (m−
1
2
∑ |j〉) is obtained from |0〉 by the application of k Hadamard transforms, one
for each bit.
2. The application of the Fourier transform F . By the central result of Shor [5] F
can be implemented using O[(logm)2] gates, and we apply one Fourier transform per copy.
Therefore, the fact that m has to be a large number, larger than the number of voters n,
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should not pose a big problem. In fact, with k = 25 binary digits we can accommodate
elections in a mid size country. However, even smaller scale Fourier transforms suffice to
implement an elections protocol using the following trick: Let n be the number of voters and
suppose first that we know n in advance. Suppose, moreover, that n = m1m2...ms, where
m1, m2, ..., ms are coprime. Now, perform the election in parallel on the s states
|W 〉l =
1√
ml
ml−1∑
j=0
|j〉 |j〉 ... |j〉 , 1 ≤ l ≤ s (11)
Where each term in Eq (11) has n copies. Assume that after the measurement on the k
post-election states we get the results c1, c2, ..., ck. The number of YES votes x is satisfying
x = c1(modm1), x = c2(modm2), ..., x = cs(modms), (12)
and this set of congruences has a unique solution modn [6].
If we do not know n in advance, or if there is no nice decomposition of n to a product
of coprimes, we can do as indicated previously: Choose a large enough n to be on the safe
side, and make sure it has a comfortable decomposition. After election day is over push the
NO button as many time as needed to bring the number of votes to n, and subsequently
subtract the fictional votes before the result is announced.
3. Application of Π: Is just an implementation of an algorithm that performs j → j+1
modm, which takes O(logm) steps per copy.
Altogether, the complexity of the protocol is O[n(log2m)
2] where n is the number of
voters (or in another scheme, the number of ballot boxes) and m is the least power of two
greater than the number of voters.
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